This paper analyzes the quantitative role of idiosyncratic uncertainty in an economy in which rational agents vote on hypothetical social security reforms. We find that the role of a pay-as-you-go social security system as a partial insurance and redistribution device significantly reduces political support for a transition to an economy with a fully funded system. We conclude that the status quo bias in favor of an unfunded social security system is stronger in economies in which agents of similar age differ significantly with respect to labor earnings and wealth because of idiosyncratic income uncertainty. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers: H55, E62, H3 ᮊ 1999 Academic Press
INTRODUCTION
In this paper we explore the effects that idiosyncratic uncertainty within generations has on the result of majority voting on social security reforms. In the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risk with respect to individual labor productivity, a pay-as-you-go social security system has a role as a partial insurance device. This partial insurance role comes from two sources: on one hand, it substitutes for missing annuity markets; on the other hand, it is partial insurance against idiosyncratic income uncertainty. Ex-post, if social security benefits are imperfectly linked to contributions, the system redistributes between individuals with different realizations of the stochastic productivity process. Therefore, in a model with idiosyncratic income uncertainty, a transition to a fully funded system may have less political support than in the benchmark model in which we abstract from the existence of heterogeneity within generations. In our model, agents are ex-ante identical, and the only source of heterogeneity within generations derives from the individual realizations of the labor productiv-Ž ity shock. We find that a bias in favor of the status quo the pay-as-you-go . system can arise or be stronger than in the case without heterogeneity.
The framework used also allows us to explore what the effects of a social security reform are for the labor-leisure decision. The payroll tax to finance social security payments distorts the labor-leisure decision. Removing this distortionary taxation has an income and a substitution effect for labor supply. Our quantitative analysis shows that the substitution effect dominates and average hours worked increase slightly. At the same time, the age profile of hours worked changes: removing the unfunded social security system decreases hours worked for younger generations and increases them for older generations.
Our paper builds on the tradition of analyzing transitional dynamics in overlapping generations economies with pay-as-you-go social security sys-Ž . 1 tems, as first analyzed by Auerbach and Kotlikoff 1987 . Our focus, though, is on the political implementability of a transition from the status quo system to a fully funded system. Ž . In recent quantitative studies Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 Imrohoroglu et al. , 1998 havȇ analyzed the question of the optimal replacement rate in an unfunded system. In these papers the authors find that the replacement rate that maximizes expected utility of an agent born into the steady state is 0%, i.e., a fully funded system. 2 Our model is very similar to the one studied bẏ Ž . Imrohoroglu et al. 1995 , and we find that a newborn agent would prefeȓ to be born into a steady state with no social security system rather than 1 A more recent study is the transition between different social security systems in Huang Ž . et al. 1997 . 2 This is true as long as the time discount factor ␤ is smaller than 1, the economy is Ž . growing, or land is introduced as a fixed production factor. Feldstein 1985 analyzes a two-period overlapping generations model in which he can characterize the optimal steadystate replacement rate analytically and finds that for a wide range of parameter values the Ž . optimal rate is zero. Huggett and Ventura 1998 study the steady-state welfare consequences Ž . of the social security reform proposed by Boskin 1986 . into a social security system with an empirically plausible replacement rate of 50%.
This raises the question of why we do not observe more countries with a fully funded system or countries in transition to such a system. 3 It is our hypothesis that along the transition from one system to another, sizable redistribution between generations and between agents with different wealth positions within one generation occurs. A majority of current voters would lose along the transition and therefore favor the status quo. 4 Most studies on the political economy of social security reform 5 rely on median voter arguments that abstract from the existence of intracohort heterogeneity. Our analysis shows quantitatively how this type of analysis can substantially overestimate political support for a potential social security reform.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the model. Section 3 explains the policy experiments we consider. Section 4 discusses the calibration of the model. In Section 5 we discuss the results. Section 6 presents a sensitivity analysis with respect to the specification of idiosyncratic uncertainty. Section 7 concludes. Details of the computational procedure are contained in the Appendix.
THE MODEL
We consider a discrete time overlapping generations model. The econ-Ž omy is populated by a continuum with given mass growing at a constant . rate n of ex-ante identical individuals. Each agent faces a positive probability of death in every period. Therefore, even in the absence of altruistic bequest motives, in our economy a fraction of the population leaves accidental bequests. These are distributed as lump-sum transfers, denoted as Tr, uniformly over agents currently alive. At a certain age agents retire 6 and receive social security payments at an exogenously specified replacement rate b of current average wages. Social security payments are financed by proportional labor income taxes . Labor is supplied elasti-3 Chile, for example, has carried out such a transition. See Diamond and Valdes-Prietó Ž . 1994 for a detailed discussion of this case. 4 In our framework, resistance to policy reforms and status quo bias is expected to be higher in the presence of intracohort heterogeneity. A similar result has been derived by Ž . Fernandez and Rodrik 1991 for the issue of trade liberalization reform in a model with idiosyncratic uncertainty.
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Ž . See, for example, Cooley and Soares 1996, to appear . 6 Retirement at this age is mandatory. Therefore, we are abstracting from the effects of cally. Agents of different ages differ in their labor productivity. In addition, workers of the same age face idiosyncratic uncertainty about their individual labor productivity. We assume that workers cannot insure against this uncertainty by trading contingent contracts. Moreover, annuity markets are assumed to be missing and agents are assumed to be borrowing constrained. However, agents can use one-period uncontingent bonds as a partial insurance device against the risk of low labor productivity in the future.
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Ž . Individuals are indexed by type a , , j , where a is asset holdings, t t t t Ž . is labor productivity status at date t, and j is age. ⌽ a , , j is the t t t Ž . measure of agents of type a , , j at date t. Each agent dies with t t probability 1 at age J. Let denote the probability of being alive at j period j q 1, conditional on being alive at period j. Agents retire at age jr and receive social security benefits SS while alive. Individuals are endowed with one unit of time and enter the economy with zero assets. Ä Ž .4 J Preferences over consumption and leisure c , 1 y l are assumed
to be representable by a standard time-separable utility function:
where ␤ is the time discount factor and is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. The instantaneous utility of being dead is normalized to zero. Ž . Labor productivity measured in efficiency units of labor of an agent of Ž . Ä 4 J type a , , j is given by ⑀ , where ⑀ is the deterministic age profile
of average labor productivity and is the stochastic labor productivity t status of the agent. For retired agents, ⑀ s 0. The stochastic process for j labor productivity status is identical and independent across agents and follows a finite-state Markov process with stationary transitions over time, i.e.,
Ž .
t t q1 t
Let ⌸ denote the invariant probability measure associated with Q, which we assume to be unique.
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Ž . In our model financial markets are incomplete in an ad hoc fashion, as in Aiyagari 1994 .
Ž . Cole and Kocherlakota 1998 , in a much simpler model, provide some justification for this assumption.
We assume that the aggregate technology can be represented by a standard Cobb᎐Douglas production function, so that the aggregate resource constraint is given by
where K , C , and N represent aggregate capital stock, aggregate cont t t Ž . sumption, and aggregate labor input measured in efficiency units in period t. The depreciation rate for physical capital is denoted by ␦. As usual with constant returns to scale technologies, in equilibrium the number of firms is indeterminate, and we can assume, without loss of generality, the existence of a single representative firm.
We use the following timing conventions: at the beginning of the period agents' labor productivity status is revealed, and they receive transfers from accidental bequests. Then individuals supply labor and capital to the firm. Production takes place and households receive factor income. Next agents make their consumption᎐savings decision. Finally the uncertainty about early death is revealed.
Definition of a Competiti¨e Equilibrium
Let B R be the Borel -algebra of R and P E , P J theŽ . Ž . Ž . power sets of E and J, respectively. Let S S s B R = P E = P J , and q Ž . let M be the set of all finite measures over the measurable space S, S S . conditions K and ⌽ , a competitive equilibrium is a sequence of individ-
, a sequence of transfers Tr , and a sequence of mea-
Ä 4 ϱ sures ⌽ , ⌽ g M, such that for all t, the following hold.
. associated policy functions :
where 
6. Law of motion for ⌽ :
The function H can be written explicitly as t a. For all J J such that 1 f J J:
POLICY EXPERIMENTS
As our benchmark we take the model without heterogeneity and a pay-as-you-go social security system with an empirically plausible replace-Ž . ment rate of b s 0.5 we will discuss this in the Calibration section . We assume that in period 1 the economy is in a steady state with this system.
We consider three different potential policy reforms and voting on reform vs. no reform only. Voting takes place at the beginning of period 2, after the idiosyncratic productivity shock has been realized, but before any economic choices have been made. If a reform is supported, the economy enters the transition path; if not, it stays in the initial steady state. We assume that, once a reform is implemented, the government is committed to it. The three potential reforms are ⅷ Policy Reform A: Beginning with period 2 the replacement rate is set equal to 0 and stays there forever, i.e., b s 0.5, b s 0, ᭙ t ) 1. This 1 t reform terminates the social security system immediately and does not honor entitlements to social security payments.
ⅷ Policy Reform B: The replacement rate, 50%, is linearly reduced by Ž . one percentage point yearly over 50 periods, i.e., b s 0.5 y 0.01 t y 1 , t t s 1, 2 . . . , 50, b s 0, ᭙ t ) 50. This reform terminates the social security t system gradually so that entitlements are partially honored and payroll taxes are accordingly reduced to finance progressively smaller benefits.
ⅷ Policy Reform C: The replacement rate is fixed for 20 years at 50% and set at 0 thereafter, i.e., b s 0.5, t s 1, 2, . . . , 20, b s 0, ᭙ t ) 20.
t t
Therefore, all individuals retired or about to retire keep their social security benefits, but future retirees anticipate that they will receive only part or no social security benefits. This reform allows agents to readjust their plans for the anticipated reform in 20 years.
In order to quantify the welfare effects of different policies for different individuals, we will use a consumption equivalent variation measure. We quantify the welfare change of a given policy reform for an individual of Ž . Ž . type a, , j by asking by how much in percent this individual's consump-Ž tion has to be increased in all future periods and contingencies keeping . leisure constant in the old steady state so that his expected future utility equals that under a specific policy reform. Given the form of the utility function, welfare measures are easily computed as
We use a similar criterion to compare welfare between steady states and denote by
g E 1 the consumption equivalent variation of an agent about to be born into the new as compared to the old steady state. 8 Ž . For example, an EV a, , j of 1.1 implies that if the given policy reform Ž . is put into place, then an individual of type a, , j will experience an increase in welfare due to reform equivalent to receiving 10% higher Ž consumption in the initial steady state in all future nodes of her event . tree with leisure constant at the initial steady-state choice.
CALIBRATION
The parameters of the model have been calibrated so that the initial Ž steady state for the economy without intracohort heterogeneity our . benchmark economy replicates selected observations of the U.S. economy. We consider 66 generations with the retirement age at period 46. Therefore, the model is interpreted as one in which the maximum age is 85, and individuals become economically active at age 20 and retire at age 65. The Ä 4 J Ž . probabilities of surviving have been taken from Faber 1982 . We
consider a yearly population growth of 1.1%. Together, these values imply Ž . that the ratio of retired people to active population the dependency ratio is equal to 21.6%. This number matches the ratio of population older than 65 over population between 20 and 65 from the 1990 Population Census for the United States. Notice that, given our specification, payroll taxes to finance social security payments are equal to the replacement rate times the dependency ratio. We choose the replacement rate so that the payroll tax matches its empirical counterpart. Social security payroll taxes in the U.S. data are 15.3%. However, given that the focus of our exercise is solely on retirement benefits, we subtract the part corresponding to Medicare Ž and disability insurance. Therefore, we choose the OASI Old-Age and 8 Ideally, one would like to compute the percentage increase in labor efficiency units Ž necessary for an individual to obtain the same expected future utility as under a reform or . the final steady state . This, however, would require repeated computations of the whole Ž . dynamic consumer problem for each type , which is quite costly.
. 9 Survivors Insurance rate, 10.7%. This implies a replacement ratio of 50% in our benchmark economy.
As technology parameters we chose 1 y ␣ s 0.64 to match the labor share of output. The depreciation rate is set at ␦ s 0.06. The values chosen for preference parameters are a yearly discount factor ␤ s 0.97 and coefficient of relative risk aversion of s 2.
These parameters have been jointly calibrated to match an interest rate of 6% and an investment᎐output ratio of 21% for the initial steady state without heterogeneity, and they imply a capital᎐output ratio of 3.
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The share parameter of consumption in the utility function is set at ␥ s 0.42. This value implies that in the initial steady state hours worked average 33% of the time endowment. This number is consistent with the microeconomic evidence that households allocate about one-third of their discretionary time to market activities.
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Ä 4 Ž . The labor earnings age profile ⑀ has been taken from Hansen 1993 . j Labor services in our model are homogeneous, so there is a single wage for one efficiency unit of labor. Individuals differ in their endowment of labor efficiency units according to their age and the realization of the stochastic process.
We will analyze and compare two different specifications for the stochastic component of labor productivity. The first uses directly Survey Ž . of Consumer Finances SCF data on labor earnings differentials and Ž . social mobility, as reported by Diaz-Jimenez et al. 1997 , to calibrate the Ž . stochastic component of labor productivity. The second uses an AR 1 Ž . process estimated by Storesletten et al. 1998 from Panel Study of Income Ž . Dynamics PSID data and approximates this process by a finite Markov Ž . chain, following the method proposed by Tauchen and Hussey 1991 . In the next section we will restrict ourselves to two-state Markov processes, leaving for Section 6 the discussion of robustness of these results to different specifications.
For the first specification, we choose a two-state Markov process with values s 0.5 and s 3 and persistence probabilities of the states the stochastic component of labor productivity has been normalized to 1, 9 The OASI rate includes survivors insurance. One might interpret this as a retirement Ž . benefit because it includes mainly payments to widow er s of age 60 or older. Thus, in a model where the decision unit is the household, survivors insurance payments are also transfers from working households to retired households. 10 Ž . Ž . Rıos-Rull 1996 discusses the effects of choosing different ␤, -pairs on the agé profile of labor supply, given that a capital᎐output ratio of 3 is reproduced by the model economy. Ghez and Becker 1975 and Juster and Stafford 1991 . as 80% of agents in each generation are in state 1. The value of has 2 been chosen so that the top quintile of the labor earnings distribution make three times the average labor earnings as in the data. The transition probabilities, , , have been selected so that the model replicates the 1 2 mobility facts of the distribution of labor earnings as reported by Diaz-Ž . Jimenez et al. 1997 , who report that after 5 years 69% of households initially in the top quintile remain there and 92% of households initially in Ž . the bottom four quintiles remain there after 5 years see their Table 8 . As a result, the model implies a coefficient of variation of labor earnings of 1.3 and a coefficient of variation of wealth of 1.7 for the initial steady Ž . state. Diaz-Jimenez et al. 1997 report that for the U.S. economy these two values are 4.19 and 6.09, respectively.
Notice that the spread in both labor income and wealth is much smaller in the model than in the data, 12 even though we are choosing a highly asymmetric and persistent process exactly for the purpose of increasing the spread in labor earnings and hence wealth. With such a specification we generate an important fraction of the population whose income comes mainly from labor income. On the other hand, we have a small fraction of the population whose income consists mainly of asset returns. This will be important in terms of assessing the general equilibrium effects of a social Ž . security reform, since the first and more numerous group is mainly concerned with payroll taxes and retirement pensions, and the second Ž . small group is mainly concerned with the effects on asset returns, since retirement pensions are a smaller fraction of their income when they are retired.
For the second parameterization we draw on results from Storesletten Ž . et al. 1998 . They used PSID data to estimate the following process for the Ž . Ž . stochastic component of the log of labor efficiency units, u s log : dure by construction generates a symmetric Markov chain with two groups of equal size, with smaller difference between their labor efficiency units and less persistence. Hence, compared to the previous specification, the coefficient of variation of labor earnings and hence wealth are even smaller, 0.71 and 0.92, respectively. The parameters of the model are summarized in Tables I᎐IV.
RESULTS
All potential reforms start from the same initial steady state and end in the final steady state with no social security. So we first discuss the quantitative properties of these steady states, both in the model with and without heterogeneity. Then we will turn to the properties of the potential transitions, voting outcomes and welfare analysis, separately for each of the three reforms considered. Table V summarizes the main quantitative features of the initial and final steady states for the models with and without intracohort heterogeneity. From here on we refer to the specification that follows Storesletten Ž . et al. 1998 as the ''symmetric case'' and to the specification that uses the Ž . data reported by Diaz-Jimenez et al. 1997 as the ''asymmetric case.'' Note that y is output per capita and h denotes average hours worked. As measures of income and wealth dispersion, we report the coefficient of Ž . Ž . variation of both labor earnings and wealth, c¨lab and c¨weal , respectively. We will quantify welfare changes using the consumption equivalent Ž SS . variation EV of a newborn. By construction, and independently of the specification of heterogeneity, the replacement rate drops from 50% to 0% and the tax rate from 10.7% to 0%. As a result, social security benefits as a fraction of output per capita drop from around 39% to 0%. As mentioned in the previous section, the dispersion of labor income and wealth, measured by the respective coefficients of variation, is significantly higher in the asymmetric specification of heterogeneity than in the symmetric specification, but still significantly smaller than in the data. In Section 6 we discuss whether specifications of the labor productivity process that include more states or permanent individual fixed effects can generate higher dispersion in labor income and wealth in our model. From Table V we see that both with and without heterogeneity, a switch from an unfunded to a fully funded social security system leads to higher capital accumulation in the steady state. The capital᎐output ratio increases by 11% in the benchmark model, while this increase is 12% for the symmetric case and 17% for the asymmetric case. Individuals who have to provide for their retirement by private savings and are not subject to payroll taxes accumulate a larger amount of assets. Hence the capital stock is higher in the final steady state. Moreover, in the presence of idiosyncratic uncertainty, precautionary savings motives imply even higher asset Ž .
14 and capital accumulation and hence lower interest rates. This effect is stronger the more pronounced the uninsured idiosyncratic risk with re-Ž spect to labor productivity compare the symmetric with the asymmetric . Ž specification . As a result of an increase in asset accumulation and only . modest increases in labor supply , wages increase and interest rates drop, by 1.1, 1.2, and 1.4 percentage points, respectively, in our three specifications. Notice, however, that even in the asymmetric case the economy is not dynamically inefficient in the final steady state.
Average hours worked increase by 5.2% in the case of homogeneous individuals, 6.1% and 5.4% in the symmetric and asymmetric cases, respec-14 Ž . See Huggett 1997 for a proof of this result for an economy with infinitely lived agents. The same intuition applies to our model. tively, with a policy reform. Note that average hours supplied are smaller the higher the degree of heterogeneity in the specification. At the same Ž time, aggregate labor supply in efficiency units not reported here, but see . Fig. 3 increases with the degree of idiosyncratic uncertainty. These facts are reconciled by noting that high-productivity agents decide to work significantly more than low-productivity agents. Ž Output per capita increases, because of capital deepening and mod-. estly increasing labor supply, by 12.5% in the economy without intracohort heterogeneity, by 13% in the case of modest heterogeneity and by 15% in the case of significant heterogeneity. This increase in available resources for consumption is also reflected in the welfare consequences of a social security reform. An agent to be born into the steady state of an economy with a pay-as-you-go system would have to receive 11᎐13% Ž . depending on the specification of heterogeneity higher consumption in each future contingency to be as well off as to be born into the steady state without a social security system. These welfare benefits, on which a major fraction of the existing literature has focused, derive mainly from higher per capita consumption. On the other hand, the social security system acts as a partial insurance device against idiosyncratic labor productivity risk and substitutes for missing annuity markets. These beneficial features of the system reduce the welfare benefits from a reform, this effect being stronger the more uninsured idiosyncratic risk is present in the economy. This explains why, even though output and consumption per capita show the biggest increase in the asymmetric case, the welfare benefits from a reform are smaller in this specification. Figure 1 shows the age profile of hours worked in both the initial and the final steady state. For the economies with and without intracohort heterogeneity, the termination of the pay-as-you-go system induces a shift in the age pattern of labor supply: young agents work less and old agents work more than in the initial steady state, reflecting the fact that in the absence of an unfunded system, agents by themselves have to save for their retirement. In the steady state, two main sources determine the labor᎐lei-sure decision for an agent of age j: the asset position and individual labor Ž . productivity of this agent, relative to expected labor productivity in the Ž future. Older agents have higher age-specific labor productivity equals j . 1 for age 20, peaks at 2 at age 50, and falls to 1.64 at age 65 but higher asset holdings. The higher the asset position of individuals, ceteris paribus, the lower is individual labor supply. Higher labor productivity has ambiguous effects, because income and substitution affect work in different directions. Overall, labor supply tends to decline with age. This is especially true in the model with asymmetric heterogeneity, since the degree to which agents face lifetime labor income uncertainty is decreasing in age. Therefore young agents tend to work more in order to insure themselves against this uncertainty by accumulating assets.
15
Figure 2 shows average asset holdings by generation. Asset holdings are always higher in the fully funded system for all generations than in the unfunded system, deriving from the fact that workers cannot rely on retirement payments from the social security system. Notice that the highest level of asset holdings is reached in the latest active periods of a worker in the steady state without a social security system, with assets being decumulated thereafter. Moreover, in the case with no heterogeneity, workers start saving only after their productivity reaches a certain point Ž . after age 27 . The same is true in the case of symmetric heterogeneity 15 
Ž
We observe a small, sudden increase in average hours worked at age 27 30 in the final . steady state in the specification without intracohort heterogeneity. At this age agents start to save, and the nonnegativity constraint on assets stops binding. To finance positive savings, agents have to increase their work effort. The same effect occurs with heterogeneity when the low-productivity agents start saving.
FIG. 2. Age profile of average asset holdings.
Ž . where the starting age is 22 . However, in the asymmetric heterogeneity case the young, more productive workers start saving from the earliest age on, which explains why average asset holdings are positive for all age groups. We also observe that in the presence of a pay-as-you-go system, the difference in asset accumulation between economies with no and with substantial heterogeneity are smaller than in a fully funded system. Under the pay-as-you-go system an agent retires with 17% higher average asset Ž . holdings in the presence of asymmetric heterogeneity, while in a fully funded system this number amounts to 23%. 
Transition Paths
In this subsection we turn to the discussion of transitional dynamics, voting results, and welfare analysis. In our model we can distinguish five 16 This might be interpreted as a first indication of the partial insurance role of the pay-as-you-go system, in the absence of which precautionary savings are significantly higher.
effects that determine the welfare consequences of potential reforms as well as the voting decisions of individuals:
1. Intergenerational redistribution. Depending on the reform, older agents lose part of their entitlements or younger agents contribute more than they will eventually receive.
2. Intragenerational redistribution. Payroll taxes are proportional and social security benefits are not tied to contributions in our model. 17 Hence, the social security system redistributes from agents with high labor Ž . earnings high productivity agents to agents with low labor earnings.
3. Social security as a partial insurance device. In the absence of annunity markets and insurance against idiosyncratic uncertainty, the social security system partially substitutes for these missing markets. Note Ž . that it is ex-post after uncertainty is revealed intragenerational redistribution that generates ex-ante insurance against idiosyncratic uncertainty among ex-ante identical individuals. For agents that are already born, these two effects are therefore hard to distinguish.
4. General equilibrium effects. Along the transition path wages and interest rates change. Agents with higher accumulated wealth receive a higher fraction of their income from interest payments and a lower fraction from labor income.
Elimination of tax distortions.
With an endogenous labor᎐leisure decision, the payroll tax to finance social security payments is a distortionary tax. Removing this distortion is one of the benefits of a transition to a fully funded system.
We will now attempt to disentangle the quantitative importance of these effects for each reform separately, where we note that the fifth effect Ž unambiguously increases support for a reform and the third effect to the . extent that it can be distinguished from the second unambiguously decreases support for a reform.
Policy Reform A
Policy Reform A represents an extreme social security reform, in which workers who have contributed to the social security system will not receive any retirement pension. We consider this reform to be a benchmark for 17 In the U.S. social security system individual benefits are linked to individual monthly Ž . earnings indexed and averaged over the working lifetime . The replacement rate, however, is a decreasing function of monthly earnings, so that the actual system also contains a substantial redistributive component. Ignoring the earnings᎐benefit linkage overstates the distortion of the labor᎐leisure decision induced by the pay-as-you-go system. This might bias our results in fa¨or of a reform.
FIG. 3. Evolution of macroeconomic aggregates: reform A.
comparison with reforms that phase out the social security system more gradually. Figure 3 shows the evolution of macroeconomic aggregates if this reform were to be implemented.
Under this reform the economy reaches its final steady state after about 30 years. The elimination of payroll taxes makes working more attractive. Therefore, directly after the reform is implemented there is a sharp increase in hours worked and hence aggregate labor supply. Since the aggregate capital stock is predetermined from the period before the reform, 18 the capital᎐labor ratio drops sharply, resulting in a substantial Ž . initial increase in the real interest rate and a decrease in the real pretax wage as well as the capital᎐output ratio. Because of the response in labor Ž . supply, about 60% in all three cases of the increase in per capita output 18 We assume that neither a reform nor even a vote on a reform was expected in period 1, where the economy is in the initial steady state with a pay-as-you-go system. For anticipation effects of a potential reform see the discussion of reform C, or, for a detailed investigation, Ž . see Butler 1998 .
FIG. 4. Votes in favor of reform A.
is realized already in the initial period of the reform. 19 In subsequent periods higher capital accumulation sets in, which leads to further increases in output per capita, even though labor supply decreases gradually to its new steady-state value. After the initial overshoot, interest rates fall and wages rise because of an increasing capital᎐labor ratio.
Even though the transition paths look alike for the three specifications of heterogeneity, the welfare consequences for different individuals and their willingness to adopt the reform differ significantly across specifications of intracohort heterogeneity. In the case of no heterogeneity, 40% of individuals alive in period 1 would favor the reform, while support is Ž smaller in the presence of heterogeneity 36% in the symmetric case and . 21% in the asymmetric case , i.e., the more heterogeneity introduced in the model, the less support for a reform. Figure 4 shows how political support for the reform depends on age. The effect of intergenerational redistribution is strong. In the absence of 19 Notice the importance of allowing for elastic labor supply in this type of analysis. With exogenous labor supply in the second period, output per capita would not change at all. heterogeneity everybody of age 37 or younger votes for the reform, and everybody of older age votes against it. 20 For young agents, the prospect of earning untaxed wages for the rest of their lives outweighs the cost of having contributed for some time to the social security system without Ž getting any benefits, whereas for the older population with less time . remaining to provide for retirement on their own the reverse is true. It is remarkable that agents who are already 37 years old prefer to forgo all Ž . acquired entitlements in exchange for 29 years of higher wages that are not subject to distorting payroll taxes.
With intracohort heterogeneity some generations are split in votes, with labor productivity status and asset position determining support or opposition. For the specification with modest heterogeneity, all agents up to age 32 support the reform, generations 33᎐41 are split, and all older generations oppose the reform, whereas the specification with substantial heterogeneity yields critical ages of 23 and 33.
In order to further analyze the voting decision of different individuals it is instructive to investigate the welfare changes induced by the potential reform. In Figs. 5᎐7 we show how the welfare effects of the reform, measured by consumption equivalent variation, vary with asset position and labor productivity status for selected generations.
We can see, as already discussed, that, ceteris paribus, young agents would benefit from a reform, with gains for newborns with no assets of Ž about 5᎐10% in equivalent consumption depending on the specification . of heterogeneity . Old agents are the big losers of the reform, with agents Ž . of age 60 losing about 20᎐60% for reasonable asset holdings . The situation is even worse for agents who are already retired.
For young individuals welfare gains are decreasing in their asset position. The rationale for that is that a young poor agent relies substantially on labor earnings as the main source of income, especially if she is currently unproductive and will therefore not be able to accumulate assets Ž . for the near future as the productivity shocks are highly persistent . Thus, the realized gain in welfare from removing the payroll tax is substantial, even more so considering the increase in wages due to general equilibrium effects. However, young wealthy individuals are negatively affected by a reform that decreases the return to their assets. Furthermore, young agents do not receive social security payments until far in the future, the point at which the redistributive character of the system materializes. It appears that for young individuals the removal of the payroll tax, together 20 Ž . Bohn 1998 finds, in a different, partial equilibrium model context, a cutoff age of exactly 37, with agents of age 38 and older benefitting from the current social security system. Although he does not include survivor benefits in his benchmark analysis whereas we do, we find the similarity in our results remarkable.
FIG. 5. Welfare effects of reform A: no heterogeneity.
with the general equilibrium effects, dominates the redistributive effects, Ž . so that, holding age constant, poor unproductive agents benefit more from a reform and wealthy productive agents lose. This explains why for the young generations in which votes are split, wealthy agents vote against the reform.
However, for older individuals the welfare change is increasing in asset positions, and agents with the high productivity shock are less affected by the reform. Agents of age 60 have 4 years of their working life left and therefore are not strongly affected by the general equilibrium effects of changing factor prices. They do not use asset holdings so much as a source of generating interest income, but rather consume the principal in their retirement years. Furthermore, if these agents happen to be unproductive today, there is a large probability that they will stay unproductive for the rest of their working life. These agents strongly value the redistributive nature of the pay-as-you-go system, the extent of the value varying with the degree of intracohort heterogeneity, as can be seen from Figs. 6 and 7. In the case of modest heterogeneity, unproductive agents with zero asset holdings experience a welfare loss of 45% compared to 37% for productive agents, whereas in the specification with substantial heterogeneity, in which shocks are very persistent, these numbers amount to 62% and 28%. We also observe, however, that for agents with a very high level of asset Ž accumulation agents that have almost perfectly self-insured against id-. iosyncratic uncertainty , welfare consequences of the reform do not depend on the current realization of the productivity shock.
In order to evaluate the importance of general equilibrium effects we perform the following exercise: we computed individual decision rules and voting and welfare changes for reform A under the assumption that interest rates, pretax wages, and transfers stay unchanged at their initial steady-state values. Thus, a reform only implies not paying the payroll tax and giving up future social security payments. Figure 8 shows the welfare changes for such an experiment for the specification of substantial heterogeneity.
21
21 For young generations, consumption equivalent variation is still a decreasing function of asset holdings, because the beneficial removal of payroll tax is more important for agents whose income is mainly composed of labor income.
FIG. 7.
Welfare effects of reform A: asymm. heterogeneity.
We argued above that young, poor, low-productivity agents benefit from the reform mainly via rising wages, whereas young, high-productivity agents, able to accumulate assets in the future, are also adversely affected by falling interest rates. Holding factor prices fixed, we see that now low-productivity agents are less favored by a reform, and young high-productivity agents are the major beneficiaries of the reform, which supports our previous hypothesis. Another important observation from this exercise is that for agents with a high amount of accumulated assets, the reform is Ž . more favorable less hurtful if interest rates stay constant, so that wealthier agents now support the reform. 22 We conclude that the general equilibrium effects, mainly the decline in interest rates, makes young, wealthy, and highly productive agents reject a reform that could potentially 22 Voting results for reform A with fixed factor prices are as follows: 46% support with no heterogeneity, 43% in the symmetric case, and 15% in the asymmetric case. Notice that with Ž . low or no heterogeneity, considering fixed prices would increase support, whereas in the asymmetric case total support is smaller. Support in generations which are split comes from Ž the high-productivity agents only 20% of each generation in the asymmetric case, 50% in the . symmetric case .
FIG. 8.
Welfare effects of reform A: asymm. het., fixed prices.
favor them because it reduces the burden of intragenerational redistribution they have to bear.
Policy Reform B
Policy reform B represents a more gradual transition to a fully funded system. Still, older generations lose part of their social security entitlements. Therefore, currently older agents are not affected as much by the transition as before. On the other hand, young agents contribute more to the system than they will eventually receive. Furthermore, the transition to the new steady state is much slower, and therefore currently young agents will not enjoy all of the benefits from a steady state with higher wages and zero taxes on labor income in the near future, as shown in Fig. 9 . Convergence to the new steady state now takes about 70 years. Now a majority vote between status quo and reform yields 21% support for a reform in the model without intracohort heterogeneity. With heterogeneous agents, the reform is supported by 17% in the specification with modest heterogeneity and by 2% in the specification with substantial heterogeneity. Again political support in favor of a reform is a decreasing function of the degree of intracohort heterogeneity.
In Fig. 10 we graph support for the reform against the age of voters. Supporters of the reform can be found among the very oldest and youngest generations. Figure 11 depicts the welfare effects of the reform for selected generations, as a function of asset holdings, for the asymmetric specification of heterogeneity. We chose to depict generation 81, as this generation is split in votes. The oldest generations favor the reform, at least when they have accumulated a certain wealth. This occurs because of general equilibrium effects. With this reform these generations face minor reductions in their social security benefits, but experience higher interest rates for the rest of their lives. As can be seen from Fig. 9 , interest rates overshoot on impact and then drop significantly. For this reform, interest rates are above their initial steady-state level for four periods into the reform. The increase in income derived from asset accumulation outweighs the small losses in social security payments for generations 81᎐85 and is sufficient for these agents to support the reform. As we can see, the welfare gains from a reform for these agents are rather small, amounting to about 0.5% in consumption equivalent variation. For the specification with modest or no intracohort heterogeneity, interest rates are back to the initial steady-state value in three periods, reducing the number of older generations to support the reform.
Middle-aged agents and younger retirees are the unambiguous losers of reform B. Younger retirees lose a significant portion of their acquired Ž . benefits and suffer from eventually lower returns on their savings. For example, an agent who just retired and has average asset holdings for this generation suffers a welfare loss of 6.5᎐7.5%, depending on the specification. Agents in their middle ages, say of age 45, under the reform still have to pay a significant amount of payroll taxes but will receive only a minor fraction of social security benefits. Welfare losses for these agents, with average asset holdings for this generation, are between 5.5% and 13%. Welfare losses are lowest in the no-heterogeneity case and highest for the unproductive agents in the asymmetric heterogeneity case, reflecting the fact that unproductive agents of this age start to value the redistributive character of the pay-as-you-go system, especially if the process for individual productivity is highly persistent and dispersed.
Under reform B, young agents face a substantial reduction of taxes over their lifetime, lose all social security benefits, and face significant changes in factor prices during their working lives. Welfare effects and voting decisions for these agents depend on the quantitative importance of these effects. Qualitatively, for these agents the welfare effects are similar to those in reform A, and the same intuition applies to the results. However, since the reduction of payroll taxes and increasing wages take more time in this reform than in reform A, only the youngest generations vote for the Ž . reform, and only in the case of modest or no heterogeneity see Fig. 10 . The welfare consequences of transition B in general are more modest: Ž gains of 1% at most for newborn agents facing no idiosyncratic uncer-. tainty and welfare losses of 13% at most for agents in their middle ages who are currently unproductive.
It is remarkable to compare these results with what the voting outcome would be if factor prices were to remain unchanged: 57% support for reform B with no heterogeneity, 53% with moderate heterogeneity, and 23% for the asymmetric case. 23 With fixed prices only young individuals vote for the reform, since the oldest generations do not benefit from a higher return on their savings in the first periods of the reform. Compared to the other specifications, in the asymmetric heterogeneity case, only the highly productive agents favor the reform for a large number of genera-Ž . tions generations 26᎐55 , whereas in the other cases fewer generations, but most of their members can be won for the reform.
Policy Reform C
Is it possible to design a transition in which the social security system balances its budget in every period and that is approved by a majority of voters? A possible candidate is a transition that keeps the benefits of all Ž . retired agents untouched and hence wins their votes and cuts taxes sufficiently rapidly to win support from young generations. Transition C Ž explores this possibility by keeping all benefits untouched for 20 years i.e., . for all agents already retired and then abolishing the unfunded system immediately. Figure 12 shows aggregate variables along this potential reform. Qualitatively, after period 20, in which the pay-as-you-go system is terminated, the paths look similar to those of transition A. Note that all agents are fully informed of this event in advance. Optimizing agents react to a tax cut in the future by intertemporal reallocation of the time spent in market activities. Initially, labor supply increases, then drops in the periods prior to the tax cut and increases sharply in period 21. The same is true with asset accumulation. The capital stock in period 21 is determined by asset accumulation decisions in period 20. Hence, the capital᎐labor ratio and therefore the capital᎐output ratio fall sharply in period 21 and the real interest rate rises. After this period, the economy converges to the new steady state as rapidly as in transition A. This pattern holds, regardless of the presence of intracohort heterogeneity.
Is this transition successful in attracting a sufficient number of voters? In the economy with homogeneous agents, 28% of the individuals vote for the reform, whereas with heterogeneous agents this number is reduced to 24% and 17%, respectively, for the symmetric and asymmetric specification of heterogeneity. Figure 13 shows how political support differs by age. As expected, this reform attracts current retirees. These individuals benefit Ž from higher pensions as labor earnings increase in the first 20 periods of . the transition , which more than compensates for the loss of interest income due to declining interest rates.
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Ž . Cooley and Soares 1996 find, in a similar framework, that ignoring general equilibrium effects can reverse the outcome of a majority voting on implementing a pay-as-you-go social security system. However, the youngest generations show insufficient support for this reform. Only the first five generations vote for the reform in the homogeneous case. Paying taxes for 20 years without acquiring any social security benefits is not offset by higher and tax-free wages in the future for middle-aged agents. If, in addition, agents face uncertainty about their labor productivity, the removal of the unfunded social security system as a partial insurancerincome redistribution device only finds support among the three youngest generations when they face moderate labor productivity risk and no support among the young when they face substantial risk.
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The welfare consequences for agents who are already retired or still young are similar to those for reform B. Middle-aged generations are especially harmed by the reform, as they pay full taxes for the rest of their working lives and will not receive any benefits. For example, for an agent who is 45 years old and has average asset holdings, the welfare losses amount to 13᎐25% in consumption equivalent variation, with the highest loss for unproductive agents in the asymmetric case.
SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS
Given that the focus of our study is on the effects of intracohort heterogeneity, in this section we investigate the sensitivity of our results to alternative specifications of the Markov process governing individual labor productivity.
Increasing the Number of States in the Marko¨Chain
The specification of labor productivity as a two-state Markov process may seem restrictive. In this subsection we report results for specifications with more than two states. We focus on reform A as, qualitatively, increasing the number of states has the same effect for all three reforms.
In the previous section we observed that the symmetric specification of Ž . heterogeneity, following Storesletten et al. 1998 and using the Tauchen Increasing the number of states does increase the spread between levels of individual labor productivity an agent could face. As a consequence, the dispersion of labor earnings and hence wealth increases with the number of states. Votes in favor of a reform are declining in the number of states, which supports our finding from Section 5 that political support for a reform decreases as the extent of idiosyncratic uncertainty with respect to individual labor productivity increases. The results in this subsection indicate that this is true regardless of whether the stochastic process is symmetric. 25 We conclude that the two two-state specifications used in Section 5 can serve as benchmarks, with richer specifications generating a degree of intracohort heterogeneity somewhere between these polar cases.
Permanent Differences in Labor Producti¨ity
So far the specification of individual labor productivity did not allow for deterministic differences over and above those captured by the determinis-Ž . tic age component. Storesletten et al. 1998 argue that a significant fraction of intracohort differences in labor earnings and wealth is due to permanent, individual-specific differences in labor productivity. 26 In this 25 We also repeated our exercise with Markov chains based on the data of Diaz-Jimenez et al. 1997 , but with more states. The results did not change significantly, compared to the two-state specification. 26 Given that in our model agents start to live at the age of 20, these permanent differences might be due to unmodeled economic choices made before that age, e.g., differences in Ž . educational choices. In a related paper, Kotlikoff et al. 1998 study the effects of privatizing the social security system under the assumption that intracohort heterogeneity arises purely from permanent deterministic differences. section we explore how our results change if we allow for individual-specific fixed effects. Ž . Following Storesletten et al. 1998 , the age-independent component of Ž . individual i's labor productivity, u s log , is specified as
The authors obtain as estimates from PSID data 2 s 0. We present the results for the specification with permanent differences in labor productivity in Table VII . We note that with permanent differences the dispersion in labor earnings is smaller, but the dispersion in wealth is bigger than without permanent differences. For a specific individ-Ž ual, labor productivity is less fluctuating with permanent differences com-27 These are their estimates when they choose to match the cross-sectional variance of labor earnings of the youngest cohort. The authors provide alternative estimates when choosing to match the average cross-sectional variance across cohorts. For further details about the advantages of both approaches, see their paper.
28 Note that y0.43 is the 33.3 percentile of a normal distribution with zero mean and ␣ standard deviation of , and y0.675 is the 25 percentile.
␣ ␣ . pare the estimates for and with and without permanent differences , and hence there is less substitution in hours worked between states. Given the nature of preferences, permanent differences in productivity do not induce significant differences in hours worked across types. Hence, the dispersion in labor earnings is smaller with permanent effects. However, permanent differences in labor productivity create fatter tails in the wealth distribution and hence a higher coefficient of variation of wealth.
Macroeconomic aggregates show the same qualitative behavior along a transition with or without permanent effects. Voting outcomes are similar to the specification without permanent differences, as well. The welfare consequences of a potential reform are also quite similar to those reported in Fig. 6 , with the additional feature that, ceteris paribus, agents with Ž . permanently higher productivity benefit more lose less from a reform Ž . than agents with permanently low labor productivity see Fig. 14 . This is Ž . mostly due to the fact that with only permanent productivity differences, the social security system is a pure redistribution scheme from more to less productive agents.
Overall, the results in this subsection seem to indicate that the exclusion of permanent differences in labor productivity is not an important omission in our analysis. Essentially, we obtain the same results as in the symmetric case without permanent differences.
CONCLUSION
We constructed and computed an overlapping generations economy with intracohort heterogeneity with respect to labor income and endogeneous labor᎐leisure choice to analyze the welfare effects and potential political support for different hypothetical social security reforms. We considered three different policy reforms: immediately eliminating the social security Ž . Ž . system reform A , eliminating it gradually over 50 years reform B , or Ž . announcing the elimination of the system 20 years in advance reform C .
Ž . Our main findings are that: a none of the reforms proposed gain majority Ž . support; b reforms like B and C that phase out the social security system Ž . more gradually than reform A may have less political support; and c political support for a transition from a pay-as-you-go to a fully funded system is significantly weaker if agents face idiosyncratic uncertainty. Ž These results are obtained in a model in which a newborn would in an . ex-ante sense prefer to be born into an economy with a fully funded rather than a pay-as-you-go system, regardless of the presence of intracohort heterogeneity.
Our analysis also shows the importance of general equilibrium effects in Ž determining welfare consequences measured by consumption equivalent . variation for different individuals. We find that abstracting from the general equilibrium effect of factor price changes can reverse voting decisions of a significant fraction of the population.
We restricted ourselves to three budget balanced reforms, leading to a full privatization of the social security system. There is, however, a wide range of possible reforms that are currently discussed in the political debate, ranging from complete to partial privatization to modifying the existing tax-benefit scheme or using alternative ways to finance current and future social security entitlements. The analysis of the dynamic response of the economy to these alternative types of reform goes beyond the scope of this work, and future research needs to show what the macroeconomic consequences and welfare effects of these alternative reforms are, in order to assess their political implementability.
Voting takes place at the beginning of period 2, after the idiosyncratic productivity shock has been realized, but before any economic choices Ž . have been made. The voting decision of an individual with state a, , j is Ž . Ž . determined as follows: if¨a, , j )¨a, , j , then this individual votes 2 1 in favor of the reform, otherwise in favor of the status quo. We now describe the step of solving for optimal policy functions in more detail. After substituting out the budget constraint and using the intratem-Ž poral first-order condition for the labor leisure choice subject to 0 F l F .
